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NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
REAL PROPERTY - FUTURE INTERESTS -
MERE POSSIBILTIES - MODE OF CONVEYANCE
The recent South Dakota case of Bechard et al v. Union
County I presents interesting questions in the field of convey-
ancing. In 1905, under A's will B became the life tenant of a
particular tract of land, and after his death, it was to go to the
heirs of B.2 In 1922, X, a son of B's deceased brother, by quit
claim deed reciting "grantor also remises, releases, and for-
ever quitclaims to the grantee all right, title, or interest that
he may acquire in the future," attempted to convey to B his
future interest or expectancy which he might obtain in the
tract as heir of B at his death. The question arose whether such
interest was a mere possibility or was clearly a possibility
coupled with an interest which existed at the time of convey-
ance.2 The supreme court held whether X held a contingent or
vested remainder was not of controlling importance; if he
held only a contingent interest there was clearly a possibility
coupled with an interest which existed at the time of convey-
ance, which was alienable and was conveyed by deed. Since
127 N.W. 2d 591 (S. D. 1947).
2 Under the rule in Shelley's case the entire fee would rest in B. After the
abolition of the rule which has occurred in most jurisdictions, the heirs of B
would hold a contingent remainder. For collection of cases regarding the aboli-
tion of the rule in Shelley's Case see 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 963.
s From the cases and statutes in which the use of the term "possibility
coupled with an interest" or "possibility not coupled with an interest" is em-
ployed, it seems evident that the courts are in disagreement as to the meaning
of or have erroneously applied the phrase. Previous to the Statute of Uses
there were certain restrictions on the creation of future interests which were
indestructible, with one exception in the case of contingent remainders. However,
after the enactment of the Statute of Uses in 1536 (27 Hn. VIII, c. 10) such
future interests as were previously void became, by virtue of the doctrine of uses,
capable of being created in the nature of springing and shifting uses, developing
contingent interests in the property which could become vested interests by
fulfillment of the particular contingency which would cause the estate to shift or
spring to the holder of the executory interest. Price v. Atmore, 1 Bulstrode 191,
80 Eng. Rep. 879 (1610). The interest created could be said to be a legal inter-
est which was yet contingent as to possession, in other words, a possibility
coupled with an interest. Manning's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 618
(1578) (whereby E had a mill for 50 years and he devised the lease to M of
all the years to come after death of E's wife, M not to devise it, but to give it to
E's son. E's wife entered, gave M a rental fee, died intestate 16 years later,
M entered and the court held M received an executory devise and such interest
in him was of sufficient quantum that upon the possibility' of E's death before
the end of the term for years, the whole of the legal interest would shift to M.)
Compare Child v. Baylie et al, 4 Co. Rep. 66b, 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (1629) (where
the possibility of the second devisee upon a possibility coupled with an interest
in the first devisee was not such an interest that would descend to the second
devisee's executor since the contingency upon which his interest might vest had
not yet occurred.) The statutes of various states give the same legal effect to
the creation of future estates as wAs accomplished by the doctrine of springing
and shifting uses giving all such estates the designation contingent or vested
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reversionary interests and vested remainders have always been
subjected to alienation, consideration in this paper will be
given only to those interests classified as contingent re-
mainders, mere possibilities, and those designated as possibili-
ties coupled with an interest so as to be alienable in accord with
statutory provisions 4 and equitable principles.
An estate which gives to its owner the present right to future
possession and enjoyment of real property is a future estate.5
A future interest means that the owner is entitled to possession
of property only at a future time,6 and includes reversions and
contingent future interests limited to third parties, which were
not estates, but mere possibilities at common law and as such
were not assignable.7 In considering the alienability of these
future interests in real property, particular attention must
be given to the extent of the future interest intended to be
transferred. The creation of future interests at common law
remainder as the case may be. N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0232 and 47-0419.
And North Dakota also declares that contingent and vested remainders are
capable of alienation and states the indestructibility of contingent remainders,
N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0230, and further goes on to exclude "possibili-
ties not coupled with an interest" from that which may be conveyed. N. D. Rev.
Code (1943) Sec. 47-0902. After examining and analyzing "possibilities not
coupled with an interest" together with interests possessed today, it appears
that no such interest is actually existent since there is no necessity for that
type of interest since the kind of interest that was previously so designated is
covered in the statute of North Dakota by the provision relating to contingent
remainders. There apparently is no reason why such a provision should be in-
corporated since its effect only frustrates and confuses the courts. In Avon
State Bank, et al v. Commercial and Savings Bank, et al, 49 S.D. 575, 207
N.W. 654 (1926) the court misapplies the use of the phrase "possibility coupled
with an interest" stating that X in mortgaging property which may become
his as an heir of his father, could effectuate a mortgage of property in which
he had no present interest had he expressly stated his intention to mortgage
that interest which may become his as an heir of his father, thereby mortgaging
a "possibility coupled with an interest." It seems inconsistent to allow one with
only the possibility of an interest to place such an interest in himself by merely
stating his intention to so create it. There is another theory as to the use of
the term which is retrospective. That is, the conveyance of a bare possibility
such as the expectancy of an heir is looked upon at the time the possibility has
ripened into a praesenti interest and has vested in the grantee upon equitable
principles. The courts then construe such an interest as being a possibility
coupled with an interest and as such is transferable. Nevertheless, there seems
to be error in this view point also because the subject of the conveyance should
be looked upon at the time it is conveyed,'and not at the time the conveyance
has become one which passes to the transferee. The basis for this is illogical in
that it is not within the province of either a court or individual to create and
convey an interest in land which is capable of conveyance when such an interest
does not exist at the time of conveyance.
4 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0220.
6 Walsh, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, (2nd Ed.) p. 460.
6 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0211; Civil Code of Calif. (Deering 1941)
Sec. 690.
Walsh, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, (2nd Ed.) p. 461-464.
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was looked upon with disfavor because of the fact that the
common law necessity of continuity of seisin forbade any at-
tempt to create a remainder where there was a lapse of time
between the particular estate conveyed and the remainder, or
between two remainders.8 The power of alienation possessed
by a tenant in fee simple was great. Under certain restrictions
he was enabled to grant interests in land in which the posses-
sion was to commence in the future. So during the period which
may elapse before the commencement of such estate, the land
may be withdrawn from its former liability to complete aliena-
tion and may be tied up for the benefit of those who may
become the owners of such future estates.0
A remainder chiefly differs from a reversion in that, as
between an owner of a particular estate and an owner of the
remainder, no tenure exists. They both derive their estate
from the same source, the grant of the owner in fee simple.
A reversion arises by operation of law from the grant of the
particular estate, being that part of the estate of the grantor
which remains undisposed of, but a remainder is always
created by an express grant.10 Until the Real Property Act of
1845,11, if feoffment were employed in alienation, there was no
occasion for a deed to limit or mark out the estates of those
who could not have immediate possession. If a tenant held a
term for years the seisin would devolve from the free-holder
as he so specified in the order in which estates were limited to
come into possession.1
2
Until nearly the end of the medieval period only vested re-
mainders were recognized.'2 The reason was that seisin could
not be in abeyance - there must have been a definite person in
existence in whom the seisin was vested.-
In defining a remainder the North Dakota statute recites:
"When a future estate, other than a reversion is dependant on
8 Burdick, REAL PROPERTY, p. 349.
9 See footnote 8, supra.
10 Williams, REAL PROPERTY, (24th Ed.) p. 409.
"t Stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, a. 3 repealing Stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, a. 4, replaced
after 1925 by Stat. 15 Geo. V, c. 20, 52.
12 Williams, REAL PROPERTY (24th Ed.) p. 424.
Is Williams, REAL PROPERTY, (24th Ed.) p. 425, note d.
14 Holdsworth, HISTORY Op ENGLISH LAW, Into., p. 68; for a recent case
concerning remainders see Conlee v. Conlee, 190 S. W. 2d 43 (Ky. 1945) stating
that in a vested remainder the present capacity of taking possession, if the
present possession were to become vacant, and not the certainty that the pos-
session wil become vacant before the estate limited in remainder determines,
distinguishes a vested remainder from one that is contingent.
126"*
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a precedent estate, it may be called a remainder...," 15 and in
distinguishing vested and contingent remainders says: " ... It
is vested when there is a person in being who would have a
right, defeasible or indefeasible, to the immediate possession
of the property upon the ceasing of the intermediate or pre-
cedent interest. It is contingent while the person in whom or
the event upon which it is limited to take effect remains un-
certain." 16
If the language of the instrument creating the expectant es-
tate clearly shows an intention to postpone the vesting until
the happening of a particular contingent event or refers to a
future point of time for the ascertainment of the persons who
are to take, the remainder will be held to be contingent.
In the middle of the 15th Century, an exception was made to
the rule that the law would recognize only a vested remainder.
In 1453 if land were given to A for life, remainder to B's heirs
(B a living person) and B died, before A's death, leaving an
heir, B's heirs' interests became vested remainders which were
contingent remainders before B's death. It was not until the
16th century that the validity of remainders dependent upon
contingencies and rules governing them were recognized and
ascertained. 17 Although common law would not uphold the vali-
dity of conveying one's contingent remainder, it would go so
far as to uphold the validity of a release made by the contin-
gent remainderman of his expectancy to the ancestor holding
the life estate, or an assignee of the life tenant. 18 Some juris-
dictions allowed the release without the consent of the an-
cestor 19 while other jurisdictions deemed such consent a neces-
sary requirement in making the release operative.20 The re-
lease could be employed only when the party receiving the re-
lease was in possession of a freehold estate. Another method by
which the contingent remainder could be conveyed and de-
stroyed was by fine and recovery, which was a fictitious pro-
ceeding to accomplish a conveyance 21 in which there was an
'5 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) See. 47-0410.
16 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0215.
17 See footnote 7, supra.
is Jeefers v. Lampson, 10 Ohio St. 101 (1859).
19 Mastin v. Marlow, 65 N.C. 695 (1871); Evenson v. Webster, 3 S.D. 382,
58 N. W. 747 (1892); Hale v. Hollon et al, 39 S.W. 287 (Tex. 1897); Bridge v.
Keydon, 163 Cal. 493, 126 P. 149, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 404 (1912).
20 McClure v. Raben, 133 Ind. 507, 33 N.E. 275 (1893); Ortmayer et al. v.
Elcock, 225 11. 342, 225 N. E. 842 (1907).
21 Guthrie v. Owens' Heirs, 18 Tenn. (10 Yerg.) 339, 841 (1837).
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agreement to conduct a law suit whereby the lands in question
became or were acknowledged to be the right of one of the
parties.
22
From the development of the early common law into modern
law, it is now generally recognized that a contingent remainder
is one in which the possession of the property is merely de-
layed until the happening of some contingent future event upon
which the vesting of the remainder is dependent. However,
that contingency is not such that it prohibits the possibility of
vesting from being coupled with an interest since the con-
tingent interest in the property is created at the time the pre-
cedent estate together with the contingent remainder are made
the subject of the grant. Upon applying this construction to the
Bechard Case, supra, it is evident that the possibility of the
grantor of the quitclaim deed (X) was coupled with an
interest at the time the devise to the life tenant with the
remainder over was made. Therefore, that interest is capable
of being classified as a contingent remainder. 23 and therefore
alienable. By the law existing today declaring (1) that a fu-
ture interest is either vested or contingent 24 and (2) by ex-
cluding a contingent remainder from that which cannot be
transferred2 5 and (3) finally, construing the conclusion that
the interest is contingent and is a future interest together with
the provision that "future interests may pass by succession,
will or transfer in the same manner as present interests," 26
it is manifest that the interest of X was alienable.
In 1829 an English court held that vested remainders and
reversions could be conveyed by deed of grant, but contin-
gent interests were mere possibilities which were deemed in-
capable of alienation by a conveyance at law. They could, how-
ever; be released to the tenant in possession. 27 It appears that
the common law conception of the contingent remainder was
22 2 Blackstone Commentaries 394; fines later abolished by Stat. 3 & 4 Win.
IV, c. 74.
23 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0215; Civil Code of Calif. (Deering 1941)
Sec. 696.
24 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0215, Civil Code of Calif. (Deering 1941)
See. 693, Minn. Stat. (1946) See. 500.2.
25 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0902; Civil Code of Calif. (Deering 1941)
Sec. 1045; S.D. Code (1939) Sec. 51.0222.
26 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0218; Civil Code of Calif. (Deering 1941)
Sec. 699; Minn. Stat. (1946) Sec. 500.6; S.D. Code (1939) Sec. 51.0220.
27 Doe D. Christmas v. Oliver, 10 B. & C. 187 (1829).
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that of a mere possibility or more clearly, a possibility not
coupled with a praesenti interest in the property.28
It also appeared that if A held the fee simple in real property,
and his son, B, conveyed during the life of A, whatever in-
terest B would have as an heir of A, the effect of the deed would
be a nullity and no interest whatsoever would pass under the
attempted conveyance. The transaction whereby a prospective
heir executes an assignment of his expectant interests in the
estate of a living ancestor has peculiar characteristics. The
subject of such an assignment is a bare hope of succession; the
interest to which it relates is at the time nonexistent and may
never exist.29 In Hunt, et al, v. Smith, et al,3o it was said: "To
make a contract of bargain and sale valid there must be a
thing or subject matter to be contracted for and if the subject-
matter is not in esse at the time of the contract, no rights can
be acquired under it." In an early Kentucky case it was decided
that a mere possibility or contingency not founded on a right
or coupled with an interest cannot be the subject of sale or as-
signment. 1 "Expectancy is the bare hope of succession to the
property of another such as may be entertained by an heir ap-
parent. Such a hQpe is inchoate. It has no attribute of property
and the interest to which it relates is at the time nonexistent
and may never exist." 82 Upon examination of the definition at-
tributed to the word, "expectancy," it would seem proper to
conclude that it is not of the quantum of being a possibility
coupled with an interest and is only a bare hope not supported
by any present interest, and is subject to vesting by the oc-
28 Where A devised to B for life, then to the next heir male of B in fee
tail and a son was born to B and B enfoeffed X in fee simple, B died and his
son entered upon the land, a peculiar construction was placed upon such a
situation. The court held in favor of X saying "...by the foeffment of the
tenant for life, the remainder was destroyed; for every contingent remainder
ought to vest, either during the particular estate, or at least eo instanti that
it determines in fact or in law, before the contingency falls, the remainder
is void." Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 (1597). This rule of
destructibility of the contingent remainder has gradually disappeared from the
law of property and has been abolished in many states and England because it
operates to defeat the intention of the grantor. Tscherne v. Crane Johnson
Co., 56 S.D. 101, 227 N. W. 479 (1929); N.D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0230;
Civil Code of Calif. (Deering 1941) See. 742; Minn. Stat. (1946) Sec. 500.16;
Iowa Code (1939) Sec. 10048.
29 Johnson v. Breeding, 136 Tenn. 528, 190 S.W. 545 (1916).
30 191 Ky. 443, 230 S.W. 936 (1921). Accord: Hall v. Hall, 153 Ky. 379, 155
S.W. 755 (1918).
a1 McCall's Admin. v. Hampton et al, 17 Ky. 697, 82 S. W. 406 (1895).
82 See footnote 29, supra.
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curence of a contingency. That definition is accepted today and
has been reiterated by the statutes of many states.3 8
The basis upon which the non-assignability of such an in-
terest as the expectancy of an heir apparent or presumptive
was upheld was perhaps dependent upon several elements. In
the main, the nature of the mere possibility not coupled with
a present interest was not such a sufficient interest in the prop-
erty as could be conveyed.34 Another reason why common law
courts gave no effect to such an attempted conveyance lay in the
possibility of fraud and deception upon the ancestor. In Hoyt v.
Hoyt 83 the court said: "At Common Law agreements for the
sale of expectancies are generally held to be pernicious and
void for the reason that they offer temptation to heirs to an-
ticipate the enjoyment of property by making disadvantageous
bargains which tend to their harm and involve the name and
character of the family." The contract of an heir in assigning
his expectancy was also looked upon with disfavor as it was
deemed to be a wagering or gambling contract, and as such
was opposed to public policy, in that one should be not allowed
by an irrevocable contract to denude himself of all control
over all his property of every nature whatever which he at the
time possess or may afterward acquire.36 The transfer was also
opposed to policy of law as expressed in the wills statutes and
intestate succession because of the fact that the conveyance
may have perverted the intent of the present owner when the
opportune time arrived for the disposal of that particular prop-
erty in the manner in which he may have desired. Apparently
the above-mentioned objection to the conveyance was that to
allow a person who was not yet capable of being determined
an "heir" because of the existence of his ancestor," to exert
control over that possibility of interest in the property which
interest had as much possibility of not ever vesting in him as
there was the possibility of it vesting in him 38 would destroy
the free-willed alienation by the ancestor.
After chancery courts were established in England, assign-
ments of possibilities made by a presumptive or expectant
B8 N.D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 47-0220; Civil Code of Calif. (Deering 1941)
Sec. 700.
84 Hite v. Hite, 120 Ohio St. 253, 166 N.E. 193 (1929).
85 61 Vt. 413, 18 Atl. 313, 314 (1889).
8e McClure v. Raben, supra.
87 See Avon St. Bank et al v. Commercial Savings Bank et al, 49 S.D. 575.
207 N.W. 654 (1926).
38 See footnote 29, supra
COMMENTS
heir were upheld. However, the equity courts did not look
upon the transaction as being an "operative upon execution"
conveyance. It upheld the assignments of choses in action, con-
tingent interests, and expectancies and of that which had no
present actual or potential existence, but which rested in mere
possibility only,3' but it treated the assignment as a present
contract to take effect and attach to the things assigned when
and as soon as they came into esse and enforced it as a contract
in rem.'0 However, it was necessary for such enforcement that
it be determined that the contract was fairly made with an
adequate consideration 41 and not against public policy.42 Upon
the vesting of that which was a mere possibility in the trans-
feror into a present interest in the property, the contract
which was executory until the moment that it ripened into
ownership was treated as having been fully executed and the
title to that property would vest in the transferee 43 or assignee.
Because of the conditions upon which such a contract will be
upheld, it is true that equity courts carefully scrutinize such
transactions" and where fraud is alleged the burden is on the
assignee to repel such inference.
4 5
It is generally accepted that "...the owner of any re-
mainder or executory interest in land has the power by an
otherwise effective conveyance inter vivos to transfer his in-
terest or any part thereof." 46 Such a theory has been uni-
versally accepted since 1845.47 However, the mode of treatment
of conveyance of a mere possibility still remains questionable,
89 Hight v. Carr, 185 Ind. 39, 112 N. E. 881 (1916) ; Morris v. Delobbel-Flipo,
2 Ch. 352, 61 L. J. Ch. 518, 66 L. T. 320 (1892).
40 Thornton v. Louch, 279 11. 204, 130 N. E. 467 (1921); See Casady v. Scott,
40 Idaho 137, 237 P. 415 (1925).
41 Clendening v. Wyatt, 54 Kan. 530, 38 P. 792 (1895); Klingensmith v.
Klingensmith, 193 Ia. 350, 185 N.W. 75 (1921); Keys v. Keys, 148 Md. 279,
129 A. 504 (1925); Dyblie v. Dyblie, 389 Ill. 326, 59 N. E. 2d 657 (1945); but
see Rickey v. Rickey, 189 Ia. 1300, 179 N.W. 830 (1920) (where heir assigned
his expectancy of one fourth interest In realty at that time valued at $3,000
and valued at $7,000 at time of the suit, the consideration was held to be in-
adequate).
42 Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S.C. 264, 84 S. E. 233 (1914). For case holding
such assignment void as against public policy see Flatt v. Flatt, 189 Ky. 801,
225 S.W. 1067 (1920).
48 Spense's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, p. 865; Glover at al v. Crandall, 163
Il1. 566, 45 N. E. 173 (1896).
44 Graef v. Kanouse, 205 Wis. 597, 238 N. W. 377 (1931) ; McAdams v. Bailey,
169, Ind. 518, 82 N. E. 1057 (1907); McDonald v. McDonald, 58 N.C. 211, 75
Am. Dec. 434 (1860).
45 McAdams v. Bailey, supra.
"02 ]ITAT'IENT Ow Paoy f ', See. 162 (1).
47 See footnote 11, supra.
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although most jurisdictions do allow a transfer of the pos-
sibility provided the instrument effecting the conveyance is
correctly and adequately constructed. A warranty deed with
the general warranties contained therein will, when the title to
the property is actually vested in the transferor, operate by
estoppel of the warranties in precluding the transferor from
denying that he did not intend to effectuate a transfer of that
particular property to the transferee. 48 However, a contrary
view is adopted in another jurisdiction stating that since there
was no interest to convey there was nothing to warrant.49 A
quit claim deed reciting "do remise, release, quit claim and
convey" or similar language adopted by each particular juris-
diction is operative only to convey whatever quantum of in-
terest the transferor owns and therefore will not place the
possibility, having become a present vested interest, in the
transferee by the estoppel or after-acquired title doctrines50
A quit claim deed within which there is a distinct recital in-
dicating an intention to convey a future interest or right,
which he, the transferor may obtain after the deed is executed,
is operative to so convey that interest which at the time of the
conveyance may have been a mere possibility."' This seems to
be the accepted doctrine in the United States with the excep-
tion of Kentucky.12 One theory upon which such transfer is
supported and that particular interest was conveyed is that
such language may be as effectual to create an estoppel as a
warranty,53 while another theory states that the distinct re-
cital in the quit claim deed showing the intent to convey the
possibility that may ripen into ownership is effective to pass
the future interest by the obvious intention of the party being
shown specifically in the instrument of conveyance.
5'
Although the assignment of mere possibilities such as ex-
pectancies will not be upheld at law, the prevailing view in-
48 Blackwell v. Harrelson, supra; Taylor v. Swafford, 122 Tenn. 303, 123 S.W.
350, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 442 (1909).
49 Spacey v. Close, 184 Ky. 523, 212 S.W. 127 (1919).
50 U. S. Bank of La Grande v. Miller et al, 122 Ore. 285, 258 P. 205 (1927);
Williams v. Reid, 37 S.W. 2d 537 (Mo. 1931).
51 Glover et al. v. Candell, supra; Bowden et al. v. Lynch et al., 173 N.C. 274,
91 S.E. 967 (1917); Inlow et al. v. Herren et al., 306 Mo. 42, 267 S.W. 893 (1924).
52 Burton v. Campbell, 176 Ky. 495, 195 S. W. 1091 (1917); Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Riddle, 198 Ky. 256, 248 S.W. 530 (1923).
53 Blake v. Tucker, 12 Vt. 39 (1940); Van Rennsselar v. Kearney, 11 How.
(U.S.) 297 (1850).
5' Inlow et al. v. Herren et al., supra; Sears v. Rule, 151 P. 2d 293 (Calif.
App. 1944).
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dicates that a court of equity looking at the equities of the
case, the intention of the parties, the consideration involved,
the good faith of the transferors, and the mode of conveyance
employed will sanction and enforce the assignments of mere
possibilities.
ELIZABETH A. KELLY
Third Year Law Student
